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EFFECT OF FEDERAL COMPULSORY COUNTERCLAIM
RULE ON SUBSEQUENT OHIO ACTION-
RES ADJUDICATA
Home v. Woolever
170 Ohio St. 178, 163 N.E.2d 378 (1959)
In an action to recover damages for injuries sustained in an automobile
collision, defendant pleaded a former consent judgment in his favor in
federal court, contending that plaintiff should have asserted this claim in
the federal court under the federal compulsory counterclaim rule.' The Ohio
Supreme Court ruled in favor of the defendant's contention, holding that,
even though Ohio does not have a compulsory counterclaim rule,2 the
impact of the federal rule resulting in a final judgment in federal court
would be recognized and constitute res adjudicata in Ohio.
The concept of compulsion of counterclaim is not new. Professor Millar
finds its earliest appearance in New Jersey as long ago as 1722. 3 However,
a compulsory counterclaim rule did not appear in the federal courts until
the adoption of the Federal Equity Rules of 19124 which rule was incor-
porated into the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938. At least eighteen
states have adopted one form or another of a compulsory counterclaim rule
for their own jurisdictions.5
1 Rule 13a, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District Courts.
2 See Ohio Rev. Code §§ 2309.14, 2323A0 (one who brings an action which he could
have asserted as a counterclaim in a prior action cannot recover the court costs in the
later action).
3 Millar, Civil Procedure of the Trial Court in Historical Perspective 137 (1952).
See Lloyd, "The Development of Set-off," 64 U. Pa. L. Rev. 541, 560 (1916).
4 See Byron F. Babbitt, "Federal Judicial Code and Equity Rules" (1925).
G Professor Wright reports that thirteen jurisdictions (Alaska, Arizona, Delaware,
Florida, Kentucky,. Missouri, Nevada, New Mexico, Puerto Rico, Texas, Utah, Iowa and
Minnesota) have rules almost identical to Federal Rule 13a. New Jersey's rule is com-
pulsory only for those claims constituting "a liquidated debt or demand, or a debt or
demand capable of being ascertained by calculation." [4] N.J. Rev. Stat. § 4:13-1.
California appears to have a compulsory counterclaim rule but it is limited by definition
of "counterclaim" (that which tends to "diminish or defeat the plaintiff's recovery")
and the further rule that a defendant who wishes affirmative relief not so tending pro-
ceeds by "cross-complaint" (any claim "relating to or depending upon the contract,
transaction, matter, happening or accident upon which the action is brought") in which
case his "cross-complaint" is not compulsory. Cal. Code of Civ. Proc. §§ 437 and 442.
Idaho and Montana have rules much like California. West Virginia has a compulsory
rule only in suits before a justice of the peace whose jurisdiction is limited to $300
claims whereas his jurisdiction is optional with the parties in excess of that amount.
W. Va. Code §§ 4978 and 4979(a) (1949). Arkansas is said to have a compulsory coun-
terclaim rule by virtue of court interpretation of its pleading statutes. See Charles
Alan Wright, "Estoppel by Rule: The Compulsory Counterclaim Under Modern Plead-
ing." 38 Minn. L. Rev. 423 (1954). Wright does not categorize those states (Indiana,
Nebraska, Oklahoma and Wyoming) which have rules making counterclaims permissive
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The precise issue, whether or not a state court, not having a compulsory
counterclaim rule in its own jurisdiction, would recognize the federal rule
as res adjudicata, had not been met in Ohio and rarely has it ever been
squarely met.6 Many cases have arisen in states which also have a compul-
sory counterclaim of their own, wherein there was no question of recognizing
the federal rule but merely a holding under that state's own similar rule.7
The cases in the federal courts seem to fall into two categories tangential
to our question. The first group involve the situation where an action was
originated in a federal court, no counterclaim filed, and during the pendency
of the federal action an independent action was brought in state court which
should have been asserted as a counterclaim in the federal court. The
question was whether the federal court could enjoin the state action under
those circumstances. In each case, the federal court refused to abate the state
action. 8 The second group of cases arose from the filing of an action in the
federal court which could have been brought as a counterclaim in a prior
state action. The courts there have held, even where the later action would
have been a compulsory counterclaim had the original action been brought
in federal rather than a state court, that the law of the state jurisdiction
prevails as to the impact of a state's final judgment.9 The Ohio Supreme
Court relied on the latter line of cases to support its conclusion that the law
of the first forum should be applied by the second forum.
By accepting finality of judgment and uniformity as the controlling
policy factors, the court has escaped the difficult problem of determining if
the federal rule itself is one of procedure or substance.10 In applying this
view, the Ohio court had only to decide the final impact of the federal rule
in the federal court. The conclusion being that it was res adjudicata in
yet assessing a court costs penalty on those who bring a separate action on claims
which could have been counterclaims (as in the Ohio statute, supra note 2) as being
compulsory counterclaim jurisdictions. Millar, on the other hand, classifies the latter
as merely another, admittedly weaker, form of compulsion. Millar, supra note 3.
6 Meacham v. Haley, 270 S.W.2d 503, 38 Tenn. App. 20 (1954) (held, that an omit-
ted counterclaim in federal court is barred in an attempted action on it in state court.
Tennessee does not have a compulsory counterclaim rule.) Cf. Campbell v. Ashler, 320
Mass. 475, 70 N.E.2d 302 (1946), noted 15 U. Chi. L. Rev. 446 (1948).
7 See, e.g., Hughes v. Holden, 316 S.W.2d 710, 22 A.L.R.2d 621 (Ark. 1958);
Flickinger v. Swedlow Engineering Co., 45 Cal.2d 388, 289 P.2d 214 (1955); Keller v.
Keklikian, 362 Mo. 919, 244 S.W.2d 1001 (1951); Lacy v. Carson Manor Hotel, Inc.,
297 S.W.2d 367 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956).
8 Red Top Trucking Corp. v. Seaboard Freight Lines, Inc., 35 F. Supp. 740, 742
(S.N.Y. 1940) (the court in discussing whether the state is bound by the federal
rule or not said, "But that is the province of the state court, and it is a very different
matter to ask the federal court to exercise its injunctive powers to insure that result.") ;
Fantecchi v. Gross, 158 F. Supp. 684 (E.D. Pa. 1957) appeal dismissed 255 F.2d 299
(3d Cir. 1958).
9 See, e.g., Grodsky v. Sipe, 30 F. Supp. 656 (E.D. Ill. 1940) (held, that since the
state had no compulsory counterclaim rule, the claim was permissive only and might
be asserted later in an independent federal action).
10 Wright suggests this argument in his article cited supra note 5, at 435-436.
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federal court, Ohio evidently felt that the impact of the rule was the same
as if the counterclaim had been asserted in federal court and an adverse
judgment handed down.
It is conceivable that an argument could be built against recognition
of the federal rule by states on the ground that giving substantive effect to
the rule allows the federal courts to cut off the right of a party in a state court
for failure to comply with a "procedural" rule designed simply to expedite
litigation in federal courts. It is generally agreed that the purpose of the
compulsory rule is to reduce the volume of litigation and promote the speedy
and inexpensive determination of controversies by barring re-litigation of the
same set of facts."' Admitting that this is an honorable and sensible purpose,
one might still ask why the rule should be allowed to sever the rights of a
party on those facts in another jurisdiction, whose docket problems should
be of no concern to the federal courts. If the state courts (or legislature, as
the case may be) feel an urgent need for cleaning up their backlog, why
haven't they established their own compulsory rule? From this point of
view, might it not be argued that the res adjudicata doctrine is impractical
in this situation, that its impact is too harsh when balanced against the
interests of the parties on the merits of the case, and that the doctrine should
therefore not be applied here.'2
The Supreme Court of the United States has recognized the conflict be-
tween finality of decision and the policy against subversion of the forum state's
policies by another state in the field of domestic relations. Upon the balancing
of these interests, the Court chose to shelve the need for the certainty of
finality of judgment among the states in favor of the need for protection of
11 Id. at 431; Millar, supra note 3 (note that Millar would limit the application
of the rule to counterclaims which operate by way of defense to the principal claim).
12 In writing of the merit of the concept of compulsion Wright states, "Indeed
critics of such a rule are accustomed to present it in terms of the deserving widow,
a horde of hungry orphans clutching at her tattered shawl; who is euchered out of
her just claim against the scheming banker because of her inexperienced lawyer's failure
to plead a compulsory counterclaim. The image lacks some elements of realism."
Wright, supra, note 5, at 432. This colorful rebuttal of the critics of the compulsory
rule, compelling though it may be, should not lead one into ignoring the fact that
situations not altogether foreign to the one Wright describes do present themselves.
In Keller v. Kekllkian, supra, note 6, the defendant's insurance counsel dismissed his
action with prejudice, ignoring the fact that defendant had a counterclaim which he
had not yet asserted. Naturally, the court applied Missouri's compulsory counterclaim
rule to defendant's attempt to re-establish himself in a separate action. Cf., Ross v.
Stricker, 153 Ohio St. 153, 91 N.E.2d 18 (1950), where the defendant's insurer satisfied
a judgment in favor of plaintiff while defendant's personal lawyer had an appeal of the
same action pending. The Ohio court held this was res adjudicata on defendant himself!
Fortunately some courts will not permit this harsh consequence. See Perry v. Faulkner,
98 N.H. 474, 102 A.2d 908 (1954); DeCarlucci v. Brasley, 16 NJ. Super. 48, 83 A.2d
823 (1951). It is encouraging to note that in the noted case, the Ohio court cites the
latter two cases, indicating that Ross v. Stricker, supra, may not be followed in the
future.
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the rights of the individual and the interest of the state of his domicile.13
Therefore, such a result is not new and thus cannot be said to be un-
reasonable per se.
By accepting these policy considerations as controlling, the res adhidi-
cata problem could be readily skirted by finding that the federal compulsory
counterclaim rule is procedural only. Thus, it should be given no more
extraterritorial effect than any other procedural rule which may be a bar
to a cause of action in one jurisdiction, but not in another.14
Despite one's feelings as to the correctness of this ruling, it is important
to the Ohio lawyer, as well as those of other states having no compulsory
counterclaim rule, to note the problems inherent in this area.15 This case
is conclusive of Ohio's position as to the federal rule, but Ohio has not yet
been faced with a similar rule of another state. Perhaps, in the face of the
domestic relations decisions, the Ohio court may be receptive to the alterna-
tive argument suggested herein when dealing with a "hard" situation of
the latter class.
Lester S. Lash
13 See Williams v. North Carolina (II), 325 U.S. 226 (1945); Williams v. North
Carolina (I), 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
14 This argument finds support in the application of the Erie Railroad doctrine to
the noted case. If the federal rule is substantive, then it would appear that the Ohio
rule as to counterclaims should prevail in federal court. Since it clearly does not, it is
logical to conclude the federal rule is purely procedural.
15 In a footnote the Ohio court suggests that, under these circumstances, Ohio Rev.
Code § 2309.19 might apply and create the same result as if plaintiff here (defendant
in federal court) had expressly released defendant of any claim against him. A closer
reading of the statute indicates that the court's interpretation of the statute is incorrect,
thus the suggestion is without merit.
